Part One

Fighting the Bin Tax – what was necessary

When an attack is made on the working class or an issue emerges, it is necessary to assess the specific features of the issue, how it is likely to unfold and what is the mood of people before deciding on how the battle can best be fought.

From the start the Socialist Party felt the battle against the bin tax would be more difficult than the struggle a few years earlier against the water charges.

The campaign had to be based on the principle of mass non-payment and therefore the campaign would be one of organised civil disobedience in defiance of an unjust tax. The idea advocated by some in the Labour Party and in the unions that people should protest but pay up, as to do otherwise would be against the law, would simply give the council what they wanted and amounted to surrender and would be a signal to the political establishment to continue their attacks on living standards.

It was a prerequisite in order to have a campaign in the first place, to advocate mass non-payment. If they tried to pursue people through the courts for payment, it would be essential to delay, obstruct and ultimately advocate that people defy any court orders regarding payment of the charges. At the same time it would be necessary to act to create as much political pressure as possible to try to force the councils and the government to retreat. However none of these things: mass non-payment, the confidence to defy the courts or forcing a political retreat, could be achieved unless strong campaigns were established in the majority of working class communities in the four different council areas of Dublin.

The need for campaigns in as many communities as possible was given added importance even compared to the battle against the water charges. Firstly, this government was more determined than previous ones to impose a new tier of local, double taxation. They were going to do everything in their power to impose it as a vital part of their strategy to implement capitalist neo-liberal policies including privatisations. Secondly, they chose a bin tax as the form of double taxation because they knew that gave them the option of withdrawing the refuse service from those who refused to pay.

Non-collection of bins was a very serious sanction against people and there were no easy tactics that could be adopted that would overcome the effect of non-collection of bins. The government and the councils felt that non-collection would force people into paying the tax. In order for the campaigns to have the power to defeat a policy of non-collection, they would need to have a real social base and would need to cover the vast bulk of working class communities. Having looked at the issue, the Socialist Party came to the view that while legal actions and political pressure would be important features, the campaigns could only possibly defeat a policy of non-collection by direct, mass action and creating a crisis in the council refuse service. That could only happen if there were well organised campaigns in all council areas. Having an understanding of the type of campaign that was necessary is one thing, whether the mood exists to build such a campaign, is a separate matter altogether.

The attitude of the working class to struggle and the bin tax

The growth in the economy over the last fifteen years has had a big impact on Irish society. In many respects the situation for working class people improved considerably, in particular with regard to the unemployment and job insecurity that was dominant in the 1980s. The rise in living standards has in a sense softened some attitudes and the orientation to struggle and campaigning activity amongst working class people has in general diminished compared to the 1970s and 80s. However the ‘Celtic Tiger’ boom, and in particular the growth since 2001, has been lob-sided and Ireland has also become an increasingly polarised and unequal society. People face many serious difficulties such as the crises in the health and education systems, the struggle to buy a home and pay large mortgages. In fact since 2001, the renewed attacks on basic conditions by big business and the right wing policies of the government, such as the raft of new stealth taxes and the increases in the cost of living, have created real anger amongst the working class.

Attempts by workers to struggle have been consistently stifled and consciously held back by sections of the leadership of the trade union movement. This was particularly shown in relation to workers in the transport sector over the last few years. Workers in Dublin Bus, Bus Eireann and Iarnrod Eireann were due to take strike action during the EU Presidency in 2004, as part of a campaign against privatisation. However their strike action was sabotaged when the leadership of SIPTU called off the action at the eleventh hour.

SIPTU’s senior full time officials enraged public transport workers by calling off the strike. If the SIPTU strike committee in Dublin Bus had placed "unofficial" pickets on the depots in defiance of the leadership, it is possible that a very significant number of the workers would have followed their lead. Such action could have opened up a battle between these workers and the SIPTU bureaucracy. The trade union bureaucracy in general has come under real pressure and they will not be able to indefinitely hold back workers who want to defend their conditions.

The government’s neo-liberal agenda, attacks from management in the private and public sectors and the treacherous role of the trade union bureaucracy are creating the conditions in which a new layer of militant trade unionists will develop. Even the government understands the anger and volatility that exists in society and have shown a nervousness regarding the potential that exists for struggles against their policies. That is why they have put intense pressure on the union bureaucracy to call off strikes on a number of occasions over the last couple of years and have tried to repackage themselves since the local elections. That workers in a number of private sector firms including some multinational companies, have sought to join trade unions indicates the basic desire that exists amongst some of the most exploited sections to get organised.

The anger and opposition that exists amongst workers to increased exploitation and to the government’s neo-liberal and privatisation agenda has yet to be translated into major industrial struggles. However, we believe that the lack of struggle during the period under discussion, between 2001 and 2004, was not due to an unwillingness amongst the working class to fight but increasingly was down to the rotten role of the trade union leadership and the absence of an alternative. The Socialist Party believes that there was and is a willingness to struggle if a serious and credible lead is given.

That was the context in which the issue of the bin tax emerged in Dublin. Many working class people understood that the bin tax represented the thin end of the wedge, that it was a key part of a Government drive to impose more taxes and privatisation of services. That understanding coupled with the traditional opposition to the unjust tax system and combined with the general anger in society meant that the conditions were favourable for building anti-bin tax campaigns in all the working class areas of Dublin.

Campaign leaders try to hide weaknesses in city council campaign by understating the potential that existed

Many anti-bin tax activists have put in a huge amount of very good work over the last few years in communities in the Dublin city area. Nothing ever works out exactly as planned and the Socialist Party knows very well that a campaign can never be perfect and the work of our party certainly isn't. It is important though to have an honest and balanced assessment of a campaign’s strengths and weaknesses, so the movement can go forward on the best basis possible. In our view some of the leaders of the campaign in the city area made significant mistakes in relation to how the campaign was built and those mistakes have damaged the struggle.

Below are some representative quotes from Dermot Connolly’s article of last year which outline some views on the potential that existed for the campaign and problems it faced:

(a) "Along with the water charges it (the bin tax battle) is the only serious mass struggle to have taken place since the 1990s. In Dublin city, it is the biggest struggle of its type since the Housing Action campaign of the 1960s".

(b) "This has been achieved against a background of a general retreat in working class consciousness and organisation over the 1990s to the present, the criminal sabotage of the struggle by the right wing union leaders, and a massive propaganda barrage by the capitalist media."

(c) "One real weakness that has been shown is that there are large parts of the city, especially the north side, where the combined left does not have a single member!"

(d) "This situation in the workplace shows the real problem of organising any sort of struggle at the present time. There is a long way to go in rebuilding the organisation and the confidence of the working class in the key area, the workplaces. Unfortunately, none of the forces of the left have any base of any consequence, in any workplace around the country."

Dermot Connolly tries to create a sharp contrast between the major struggle that did take place in the autumn of 2003 and the very difficult conditions he says existed for building the campaign. This is done in order to try to convince the reader that the leaders in the city campaign did everything in their power to build the campaign in the city area. At one point in his article he actually states: "The weaknesses of the campaign flow not from this or that mistake by its leadership, but from the latter factors mentioned above" (see quote (b) above). It is necessary to respond to this conscious overstating of the problems that existed and the mistaken reliance on the existing very weak "left forces".

Writing after these events, Dermot Connolly questions the material basis amongst the working class or sections of the working class for the anti-bin tax campaign. In an attempt to justify why the city campaign wasn’t built in some key working class areas, he raises a question mark over the attitudes of working class people in important communities. In his article he divides the working class in Dublin into west and east of the city, with those on the west having "a long tradition, although weakened by the 1990s, of working class organisation and struggle". He says, "there are large parts of the city, especially the north side, where the combined left does not have a single member". Dermot in reality argues that the absence in some areas of a strong working class tradition and a few left activists ("a key ingredient") meant that the campaign wasn't built.

While it is sometimes necessary to characterise areas for the purpose of activity, this division and characterisation of the working class is false and some of the areas that Dermot Connolly is referring to make up a vital part of the working class of the city. Travel eastwards from Santry on Dublin’s northside and go all the way to Donaghmede and you'll pass by or through Kilmore, Beaumont, Coolock, Artane and Airfield, to name a few. The Socialist Party accepts that there can be difficulties in motivating and maintaining people in regular activity however to imply that it was difficult to build anti-bin tax campaigns in these working class areas is simply ridiculous.

It is a basic but fundamental point, that what motivates working class people to go to meetings, get involved in activities and to struggle are the material, economic and social conditions they experience. The issues that Dermot refers to like the "retreat in working class consciousness and organisation", the role of the union leaders, the media etc, are undoubtedly complications. However he understates the anger that exists and the openness of fresher layers of the working class to get involved. The bottom line is that working class people in Dublin opposed the bin tax and a significant minority, reflecting the beginnings of a recovery in the workers’ movement, were prepared to do something about it. It was not necessary for some "lefts" to already exist in a community in order for a campaign to be built, a well organised intervention from the campaign centrally could have established groups based on the best people locally.

The material basis for the anti-bin tax campaign was demonstrated by the levels of non-payment that existed in all the four council areas, particularly in the working class communities. In September 2003 on the eve of non-collection in Fingal, after a couple of years of intimidation by the council, nearly 70% had refused to pay the bin tax! Such levels of non-payment were generalised. The basis for building active anti bin tax campaigns was demonstrated by the significant numbers who attended anti-bin tax meetings in all council areas, in particular in the Dublin city council area, and the readiness of people to become part of campaign leafleting networks.

Essential that the campaigns be organised in as many communities as possible

This point about how extensive the base for a campaign is, is not of academic interest. From past experiences of campaigns based on mass non-payment, it is very important that they exist in the vast bulk of the working class communities. In our opinion the opportunity existed, given that the city campaign was established in early 2001, to build the campaign in the vast majority of the Dublin city area.

The argument has been put forward that the Dublin city campaign was as strong and as organised as any of the other campaigns, including Fingal. At most the Dublin City ABTC existed in areas that cover 40,000 houses. By "exists" we mean areas where houses are regularly leafleted by a network, where some locals, who are known in the community, are active and meet on a fairly regular basis. That means that less than a quarter of the areas of Dublin City Council were covered by city campaign.

In drawing up a balance sheet of strengths or weaknesses it is also necessary to be clear about the tasks that actually face the campaign. Non-collection of bins could be imposed quickly on any street or in any estate and in order to fight it, a campaign would need support in as many areas as possible. The ABTC in Fingal knew that the council operated 12 bin trucks but could increase that up to 15 or so if necessary. When non-collection was imposed the Fingal campaign needed to have a real base in the local areas in order to be able to pursue each bin truck. On many occasions all the trucks and the whole refuse collection service was brought to a halt. A leafleting network covered all of the area, which was essential to keep everyone informed of the campaign’s tactics particularly during the battle against non-collection.

In comparison the Dublin city council campaign was organised in at the very most only a quarter of its functional area. The city council had 60 bin trucks at its disposal. The city campaign was simply not in a position to leaflet the bulk of the houses nor could it ground 60 bin trucks! That the base of the Dublin city campaign was so limited and ill prepared at the time when generalised non-collection could have been imposed in September 2003 represented a fundamental weakness in the city campaign. If Dublin City Council had imposed non-collection at that time the city campaign would have faced a crisis. It is clear that the Dublin city campaign didn’t remotely match what was necessary a full two-and-a-half years after that campaign had been established.

The Socialist Party does not think building the anti-bin tax campaign was easy. Our criticism of a section of the leadership of the Dublin city campaign is that they didn’t prioritise the organising of the campaign throughout the whole area covered by Dublin City Council, as the essential task for the campaign. The political points made subsequently in order to justify these weaknesses - a retreat by the working class and the lack of left activists - are disingenuous, imbalanced and incorrect.

It is a hollow statement when Dermot regrets in his article that the consciousness and understanding in the working class movement had been driven back, given that his and the Socialist Workers Party’s rejection of the political methods and approach established by the water charges struggle seriously weakened the ability of the working class to fight against the bin tax. These mistakes cannot be put down to inexperience. They unfortunately indicate a political shift to the right and a movement away from a Marxist attitude to class struggle.

Let’s compare what existed in the Dublin city area to the model that Dermot Connolly himself claims it is based on - the Federation of Dublin Anti-Water Charges Campaigns which led that battle in the mid 1990s.

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