Water
Charges Struggle: The Lessons for Today
by
Kevin McLoughlin
WATER
CHARGES were strongly resisted throughout the country since 1983. In
the end it was the intense battle waged in Dublin for three years which
resulted in their abolition in 1996. There were many facets of this
campaign but this article will try to outline the key lessons that can
be learned and on that basis pose the tasks facing the new movement
against refuse charges.
Water
charges of between £70 (€90) - £90 (€114) were
passed in February 1994 by the three newly formed councils that covered
Dublin's suburban districts, Fingal, South Dublin and Dun Laoghaire/Rathdown.
The extent of the opposition can only be understood if you take into
account the big political and economic developments that were happening
at the time.
Tax
evasion by big business was rampant. The tax official's union estimated
they owed £2,500 million (€3175 million) in unpaid tax. On
many fronts they were getting away with murder. As an example, the Beef
Tribunal found that Larry Goodman's companies were involved in fraudulent
practices. Instead of being penalised, the government used taxpayers'
money to bail his company out of debt and to pay the £100 million
(€126 million) fine that Europe had imposed because of his actions.
To add insult to injury, Fianna Fail and Labour had just brought in
the second tax amnesty in six years, which wrote off a massive f.500
million in unpaid taxes from the rich.
Tax
Inequality
Political
corruption had created a very angry, left leaning mood against the Fianna
Fail/Labour government. The Labour Party had tapped into the anti-establishment
mood in the 1992 election, winning a massive 33 seats. However, within
months they were in government with Fianna Fail in one of the most unpopular
administrations in the history of the state. The mood of disgust was
palpable.
For
workers the taxation system had long been the sharpest expression of
the growing inequality in society, a blatant case of one law for the
rich and another for the rest of us. At the time, PAYE workers paid
86% of all income tax. Farmers paid 1.7% and the self-employed paid
11.6%. Corporation tax accounted for only 11 % of total tax income.
In reality the PAYE worker was paying for everything. The fact that
local taxes in the form of rates had been abolished in 1978 was of little
comfort.
The
government at that time had given a commitment to compensate local authorities
through a rate support grant, which would increase as the financial
requirements of the councils expanded. In 1978 they gave £79.3
million (€100 million) to the local authorities, by 1983 this had
increased to 163 million (€207 million). After 1984 the government
in general withheld additional cash. By the early 90s the councils were
cash starved getting in total £185.9 million (€236 million)
when the grant should have been £285.8 million (€363 million).
When - rather than fight a battle with the government for resources
- the councils decided to increase their funds by imposing another double
tax on already overburdened workers, the mood of opposition was intense.
While
they started at less than £100 (€127), people knew the charges
would increase to anything up to £400 or £500 - equivalent
to two weeks income for many. But there was another side to people's
opposition. For most it was a political decision that they'd had enough
of being ripped off by the politicians and in principle they were not
going to pay. The, by now, traditional opposition to double tax was
inflamed further when they began to charge for water, something that
most people considered to be a basic human right.
Angry
Mood
Militant
Labour, as we were called then, was alive to this issue right from the
very start. Having Joe Higgins as a councillor meant we were on the
inside crack and this gave us real authority in taking up the issue.
The party was also open to seeing the potential in the issue because
our consciousness had been raised by the role our comrades had played
in defeating the Poll Tax in Britain. We organised three public meetings
in our own name when the bills dropped just to test the mood in Swords,
Mulhuddart and Tallaght. The response was strong, over 200 angry residents
attended. Certain things became quite clear.
There
was instinctive support for a non-payment boycott from those who attended.
But it was vital that this argument was won not just amongst the activists
but with the mass of people right throughout the affected areas. The
basis of any campaign had to be substantial non-payment in order to
have a chance of victory. It was also obvious that, with a few exceptions,
existing residents' or tenants' groups were not coordinated enough,
energetic enough nor representative enough to build the type of campaign
that was necessary. We concluded that a new campaign on this issue alone
needed to be established, rooted in the communities where workers lived
and open to everyone. The first march we organised in Swords was on
a very sunny Saturday 28 May illustrated the potential when 300 locals
marched up and down the main street.
Mass
Campaign
There
were over 160,000 houses in the council areas. We established the Dublin
Anti-Water Charges Campaign and began to systematically call public
meetings and formally establish the campaign in area after area. 20,000
information bulletins were distributed as we went. 1,000 large posters
advocating non-payment and with a contact phone number were put up in
areas where the campaign wasn't yet organised to register that it existed
and would be in their locality soon. On 24 September 1994, the Dublin
Anti-Water Charges Campaign convened a conference to pull together all
the local groups and establish clearly the principles of the movement
and a campaign structure and leadership. 130 attended the event. A further
500 marched in our first city centre demo on Saturday 26 November. It
was a working class march from start to finish.
While
there were areas that the campaign still had to penetrate, as a result
of six months of hard work the campaign was firmly established with
an elected leadership, democratic structures and groups locally which
had hundreds of active participants. By the end of the year, average
non-payment stood at 65%, the figure was much higher in the key working
class estates.
Over
the next two years the campaign extended and consolidated. The campaign
went through different phases of lull and intense activity. Local public
meetings were held regularly. A leafleting network was established which
covered over 60,000 houses. More than 15,000 households paid £2
to join the campaign. This money was used as a legal defence fund. All-Dublin
activists' meetings were convened when necessary. Two well attended
conferences and another march were held, as well as countless protests
designed to exert maximum pressure on the politicians.
Showing
the strength of the movement which had been built, an incredible event
was held on 8 March 1997 in the National Concert Hall in Dublin. The
charges had been abolished three months earlier. 500-600 people who
still had legal action pending against them packed the main auditorium
to demand the dropping of all court cases. Each person willingly paid
the £10 registration fee. There was an emboldened mood of confidence
and pride that our movement had defeated the charges.
As
was often the case the media ignored this extremely significant event
but it was clear to anyone in attendance that we had come through the
most significant community-based political movement that Dublin had
seen in decades.
Tactics
& Strategy
Why
was the Dublin water charges campaign able to achieve a victory unlike
other campaigns on similar issues? The leadership provided by Militant
Labour served to maximise the power of the working class communities.
Our analysis gave us a clearer view of how the battle was likely to
unfold. We were able to outline at the outset a strategy and at the
decisive times adopted the best tactics to counter the attacks of the
councils.
The
imposition of the charges was not a decision taken by small time local
politicians on a whim. Undoubtedly they underestimated the potential
for the opposition to double taxation to get organised. However this
was a serious attack by the ruling class as part of their wider offensive
against ordinary people. There was a lot at stake. The ground had been
prepared by forcing through charges in the rest of the country. They
kept the most difficult area till last. They wanted to impose the charges
from what they considered to be a position of strength.
We
explained that regular protests, marches or lobbying of the politicians
alone would not be enough to defeat the charges. We were taking on three
councils and the government who had serious resources including the
legal system and the state on their side. Of course we created intense
political pressure particularly in the run up to the yearly estimates
meetings but the charges were very unlikely to be voted out in such
a way. They would try to ride out such stormy periods. The movement
needed to be much more extensive than that if it was going to win. The
battle was likely to go on for a number of years.
Non-payment
Non-payment
had to be the basis of the campaign. It was a way for every person to
participate in the campaign and it linked thousands of people in united
action. It was the nub of the issue; they want your money so you have
to refuse to give it to them. We argued strongly that without non-payment
there was no campaign. Mass non-payment had to be established and then
maintained, regardless of the consequences. However, it is one thing
to state that and it is another thing to be able to withstand the attacks
and intimidation that the councils would then unleash on residents.
Crucially it was the capability of the campaign to stop disconnections
and to defend people in the courts that gave enormous confidence to
thousands of people to continue not to pay. A mood developed that whatever
the councils threw at us could be dealt with. If the council's attacks
had succeeded, non-payment would have been undermined and the campaign
could have crumbled to defeat.
Council
Tries to Hit Back
The
first real challenge came in early December 1994 when South Dublin County
Council had arranged to send out fourteen water inspectors to carry
out disconnections of non-payers. We obtained vital information from
sources sympathetic to the campaign about who exactly would carry out
the disconnections and on what day it would start. The council boasted
that 1,000 homes would be disconnected before Christmas. If that happened
the mood for non-payment would have been badly affected.
Our
Response to Disconnections
The
campaign needed to respond but stopping 14 different disconnection teams
in a very large geographical area like south Dublin could only have
been achieved if we got an active response from campaign members and
residents generally. At less than a day's notice an emergency activists'
meeting was convened in Tallaght on a Sunday. 100 responded to the call.
People volunteered for an intense period of activity. One team was established
with the job of reconnection. Cars, vans, mobile phones and CB radios
were pooled. Leaflets were distributed advertising a 24-hour disconnections
hotline. Through loud speaking equipment and through the work of activists
in the estates, people were encouraged to be vigilant, to come out and
by their physical presence stop anyone tampering with stopcocks on the
pavement.
We
got more information that the inspectors wouldn't report to work but
would go directly from their homes at 4.00am to disconnect non-payers!
However, the moment they went to do the dirty deed, they were followed
by 14 campaign patrol cars which were centrally linked to a headquarters
and therefore could be re-directed to any location within minutes. This
battle lasted for a number of days. It really stretched the human resources
of the campaign. However they were only able to carry out 20 disconnections.
Even then the water was turned back on within hours. Their strategy
of disconnecting 1,000 homes hit a brick wall and they were forced to
pull back. There was a very angry mood and if they had continued there
was a real chance their actions would have provoked a major controversy.
Reflecting
the pressure, the new government, which had to be cobbled together between
Fine Gael, Labour and Democratic Left without a general election, intervened
with new legislation which altered the right of the councils to disconnect
domestic water supply, making it in reality an unworkable option. The
campaign had passed a severe test but had emerged strengthened. 1995
was the first year for a long time there were no water disconnections
anywhere in the country.
Campaign
in the Courts
The
councils were then forced to pursue non-payers through the courts. However
it took them a while to readjust and the first court cases took place
nearly a year later in November 1995. For a whole period the councils
operated off the new legislation and brought people to court with a
view to getting a court order allowing for water disconnection. However,
in reality, the best the councils could hope for in that situation was
a return to a disconnections war like December '94. Later they dropped
this approach and pursued non-payers in court for payment of arrears.
The
court challenge posed important tactical questions. On the one hand
it was important that non-payers understood that the campaign did not
expect any justice in the courts. On the other hand, for many people,
being summoned to court was a very serious issue. Having weighed up
the mood we concluded it would have been completely incorrect to boycott
the courts or just disrupt the sessions as some people advocated. It
was important that we went into court and defended non-payers and the
stand they had taken and clog up the system as much as possible. Not
to do so would have handed victories to the councils and would have
undermined the campaign.
Over
the three years well over £50,000 (€63,500) was raised for
just this eventuality. The best solicitors and barristers were employed
by the campaign. Campaign leaders had to pay meticulous attention to
details and preparing non-payers for their court appearances. On the
first court date 50 cases were scheduled to be dealt with. On a working
day 400 activists turned to protest and show their solidarity with the
summoned. Noisy protests were organised for every court date. The problem
for the councils was that initially the legislation they were using
was untried and our legal team exposed its many flaws. The first 50
cases were struck out.
By
May 1996 the campaign had been in court on 25 occasions. The results
for the councils were again dismal. They got 22 disconnection orders
but were not able to implement any of them. Undoubtedly some non-payers
were frightened with the prospect of being brought to court and paid
some of the charge. However the opposite also happened. Some who paid
in 1994 subsequently didn't because of our successes. Even when they
changed tack and pursued people for their arrears, fear of the courts
had diminished and non-payers understood if they held firm and boycotted
the court order, there was very little that could be done against them.
By 1997, thousands were either under summons or had orders issued against
them but non-payment levels remained high. The campaign had been able
to counter the council's arguments, their attempts at disconnections
and their legal challenge.
Political
Challenge
The
campaign then went on to the political plane to directly challenge the
right-wing parties themselves. Well over a year and a half before the
1997 general election, the question of candidates from the campaign
standing in, Dublin and linking up with similar candidates in the rest
of the country was raised. There was an enthusiastic response in the
campaign. People understood that the campaign was political and it made
common sense to try to punish the politicians who had implemented the
charges. Again our party played a vital role in this process. We explained
that the campaign wasn't party political and was open to all who wanted
to tight on the issue. But we were honest and up front that we were
members of Militant Labour. When the proposal was put forward in January
1996 that the campaign should endorse Joe Higgins, the Militant Labour
candidate in the April '96 Dublin West by-election, there was no opposition
from the ranks of the campaign. The feeling was that Joe, as chair of
the campaign, deserved the full support of the campaign because of the
role he and the party had played. There was no mood that the campaign
was being politically abused.
Victory
in Sight
Against
all the expectations of the establishment parties, we turned that by-election
into a referendum against the water charges with Joe only failing to
take the seat by a whisker. The historic significance of that result
bath for us and the movement generally has been dealt with in other
material we have produced. Our party became the political arm of the
water charges movement. The result was only possible because of the
authority of the campaign and again the willingness of people to be
active in the by-election itself.
Scared
now of the influence that the campaign could potentially wield in a
general election in Dublin, the government were resolved to get rid
of the charges and they were duly abolished throughout the country in
December 1996. We had held back the council's offensive but the result
in the Dublin West by-election saw the campaign take the initiative
in such a decisive way that it represented the final nail in the coffin
of the water charges. They had been battered into submission.
The
campaign had gone through many stages of development. It built its membership
and influence using the traditional methods of the labour movement.
It used direct action to stop disconnections. It switched between legal
and illegal tactics by sometimes using the courts, only to defy the
courts' rulings in the best tradition of civil disobedience.
The
lessons are clear. The first task was to build mass non-payment because
if mass non-payment was maintained the tax was dead. That was done through
hundreds of public meetings, probably over a million leaflets and using
the media to challenge the propaganda of the councils. The second task
was to defend non-payment through resisting disconnections and the courts.
All
this was achieved because of the outstanding role that members of our
party played in terms of strategy tactics, thoroughly professional organisation
and because the campaign had hundreds of organisers and leafletters
based in all the key housing estates. Unlike other campaigns it was
the conscious approach of the campaign leaders to develop activists
in each area. The success of the campaign depended on people stepping
forward. Time and again the issues and what needed to be done were discussed
clearly and patiently with residents. On that basis you could see the
confidence of people grow, which was essential for turning residents
into campaign activists. Through the activists and our successes the
campaign developed a mass influence with tens and even hundreds of thousands
following its lead.
Dun Laoghaire/Rathdown Council and now Dublin Corporation have imposed
a charge for refuse collection. Local charges have not been a factor
in the city part of Dublin since 1985. The water charges did not apply
in this area. As a sign of fear of our party and of a water charges
mark II, councillors in South Dublin and Fingal rejectedrefuse charges
unanimously.
Lessons
for the Fight Against Refuse Tax
It
is very important that the real lessons of the anti-water charges movement
are applied to the specific conditions that relate to refuse charges.
The recent experiences of the campaigns in Drogheda and Limerick must
also be taken into account.
While
the rates of income tax have been reduced, it is still the case that
the vast bulk of tax is paid by the PAYE sector. There is still a strong
mood of opposition to any form of double taxation. However there are
certain differences between water charges and refuse charges. People
are concerned about the environment and the councils will try to pose
this as a green charge. However this can be quite easily dealt with.
One of the sanctions that the local authorities can implement is the
non-collection of the rubbish from non-payers, which happened in both
Drogheda and Limerick.
People
are more fearful of this than they were of water disconnection. It is
easier not to collect rubbish than it is to disconnect water. Re-connection
was relatively straightforward and quick and was being practiced for
many years around the country. People are less sure what to do in the
event that rubbish is not collected from a substantial number of homes.
The Question of Tactics
The
refuse charges have been implemented in Dun Laoghaire/Rathdown for over
a year now. The council has at this stage not withdrawn the service
to non-payers nor has it brought people to court. It has confined itself
to propaganda and threats. It is one thing with drawing the service
in Drogheda or Limerick but it is an altogether more serious thing to
do it in a city the size of Dublin. We cannot be sure exactly what they
will do and the key thing at the moment in both areas is to consolidate
mass non-payment and develop the active base of the campaign.
It
is vital however that any new campaign is as sharp on tactics as the
water charges movement. Bringing people to court holds legs fear now
than before and can be countered. The most serious weapon the councils
have is to withdraw the service and the campaign must come up with appropriate
tactics, otherwise confidence in the campaign and mass non-payment can
be undermined.
In
Drogheda, within seven months of implementing the charge, the council
withdrew the service. In Limerick, within four months of privatising
the service, Mr Binman stopped collecting the rubbish of non-payers.
We need some more discussion about what people should do practically
with non-collected rubbish with a view to putting huge pressure and
the responsibility for such a situation back on the councillors.
In
Limerick the campaign identified local sites owned by the local authority
which were relatively close to most housing estates and advocated that
in an organised way residents should dump their rubbish there on a weekly
basis. The council would then be forced to clean it up. At the same
time the campaign wanted to put the councillors under intense political
pressure. Unfortunately while serious attempts were made to implement
such tactics it didn't materialise.
To
implement such an approach you would need a vibrant campaign with numbers
of activists in each estate. To achieve this you need to convince people
to be active and that takes a certain period of time. Within three and
a half months of people becoming aware of the charge their bins were
not being collected. It was very difficult in that time to prepare activists
and residents generally for what needed to be done.
Activists
Crucial
For
the movement in Dublin certain tasks are already clearly posed. The
campaign must have activists in each estate and area who can intervene
and affect the mood of the community. We know what sanctions the councils
can impose and we need to work out a response that can capture the imagination
of residents and be seen to be achievable. One aspect of the campaign
which assumes even more importance than during the water charges battle
is the needed to build strong links with council workers generally and
the bin workers in particular. If the campaign was able to get these
workers to agree not to withdraw the service to non-payers, the council
would be in difficult. As of now many of the bin workers in Dun Laoghaire/Rathdown
have stated that they support the campaign and will refuse to implement
any such instruction from the council. It is very important that a key
part of what the campaign stands for is no privatisation and for increased
investment to expand council services. The additional cash necessary
must come from central government.
Just
as the water charges developed from being a very serious community campaign
to being a successful challenge to the establishment parties, there
is also huge potential to do the same in Dublin City. We will have to
see how things develop but because leadership, strategy and tactics
are essential, our party will have a crucial role to play.
For more information on the campaigns against refuse charges in Dun
Laoghaire/Rathdown and Dublin Corporation, contact the Socialist Party
at (01) 6772592.